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Abstract
We present an empirical analysis of the European electronic interbank market of overnight lending 
e-MID during the years 1999-2009. After introducing the market mechanism, we consider the activ-
ity, defined as the number of trades per day; the spreads, defined as the difference between the rate of 
a transaction and the key rates of the European Central Bank; the lending conditions, defined as the 
difference between the costs of a lent and a borrowed Euro; the bank strategies, defined through dif-
ferent variants of the cumulative volume functions; etc. Among other facts, it emerges that the lending 
conditions differ from bank to bank, and that the bank strategies are not strongly associated either to 
the present, past or future spreads. Moreover, we show the presence of a bid-ask spread-like effect and 
its behavior during the crisis.
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1 Introduction
Interbank markets play at least two crucial roles in modern financial systems. First and 
foremost, it is in such markets that central banks actively intervene to guide their policy 
interest rates. Second, well functioning interbank markets effectively channel liquidity from 
institutions with a surplus of funds to those in need, allowing for more efficient financial 
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intermediation. Thus, policymakers have an interest in a financial system with a well func-
tioning and robust interbank market, that is, one in which the central bank can achieve 
its desired rate of interest and one that allows institutions to efficiently trade liquidity. 
Interbank markets have distinct features (Beaupain and Durré, 2008): (i) the information 
on the majority of trades is not centralized; (ii) the market is highly concentrated (Iazzetta 
and Manna, 2009); (iii) given the close players, reputation plays an important role; (iv) the 
market is deeply influenced by the monetary policy; (v) banks tend to prefer to deal with 
other banks instead of resorting to central bank facilities; (vi) some market participants 
systematically provide liquidity and others systematically demand for liquidity; (vii) large 
banks typically borrow from a number of smaller creditors (Iori, De Masi, Precup, Gabbi 
and Caldarelli, 2008).
The interbank market can be managed in different ways: physically on the floor, by 
telephone calls, or continuously on electronic platforms. In Europe, the interbank trades 
are quoted in all these ways, generating high information asymmetries. The only electronic 
brokerage market is the Italy-based market e-MID (electronic Market for Interbank De-
posits) aimed at allowing an electronic and multilateral management of banks’ treasury 
flows. Moreover, all the trades, being of relevant size, are automatically settled in real time 
via TARGET 2. E-MID is a centralized market for the interbank lending of capitals in 
four different currencies (Euro, British Pound, US Dollars and Polish Zloty), directly 
or via agent banks, and for a rich set of different contract specifications, such as differ-
ent maturities. However, the large majority of volumes are traded in the Euro section of 
the market, and, more specifically, on the overnight contracts, defined as the trade for a 
transfer of funds to be effected on the day of the trade and to return on the subsequent 
business day. The number of transactions and the volume increased systematically until 
the beginning of the financial crisis, with an average of 450 transactions each day and 
an average exposure of about 5.5 million Euros per transaction. This evolution has been 
explained with the trend toward real-time settlement for payments, securities, and foreign 
exchange transactions that took place in recent years (Baglioni and Monticini, 2008). This 
trend has increased the value of intraday liquidity. Interbank deposits as a percentage of 
total assets of the banking system increased from 8% in 1993 to approximately 16% in 
2007 (Iazzetta and Manna, 2009).
The e-MID is an order-driven market, providing full information on the order book and 
allowing the participants to directly act on it, without any intermediary institution between 
potentially matching interests. Each participant lending capitals must actively accept or 
decline a trade with another bank; the market does not provide any built-in mechanism to 
consistently check the counterparty risk; credit lines at each institution must apply their own 
criteria and limits in selecting their trading partners. While for example in futures markets 
participants are asked to deposit a margin in order to partially cover their counterparty risk, 
until the 2007 financial crisis, and above all until the Lehman Brothers collapse, interbank 
markets were completely non collateralized, both because of the insignificant probability 
of default of the banking system and for the very short maturity of exposures. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, interbank trades have been characterized by reduced volumes and 
the exit of a relevant number of institutions. Central banks have changed their role from 
lenders of last resort to primary liquidity providers of the system. Moreover, to enhance 
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the recovery of interbank markets, central banks incentivised the creation of collateralized 
interbank markets, to increase the expected recovery rate and to ensure complete anonym-
ity of trades. It is the responsibility of central banks to evaluate the collaterals provided by 
banks, to verify that trades comply with established limits and conditions, and to ensure 
the prompt settlement of transactions in the event of a participant’s default, subsequently 
recovering the amount from the deposited collateral.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the financial crisis dramatically changed the 
correlation between size and interest rates of interbank trades, determining large spreads 
among financial agents that depend on their default probability and reputation. This outcome 
proves the need for a collateralized and anonymous segment of the market, with a direct 
role of central banks as guarantors. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
the mechanism of the electronic interbank market and Section 3 describes the database. 
Section 4 describes how interest rates and spreads change during time, particularly within 
an intraday horizon. Section 5 addresses the analysis to volumes, and Section 6 focuses the 
analysis to correlations between strategies, sizes and interest rate levels. Section 7 presents 
our findings on the cost of money for banks before and after the beginning of the financial 
crisis. Section 8 contains the conclusions.
2 Market Mechanism
The e-MID trades continuously, without opening or closing auctions, and with 
only a session of post-trading activity aimed at controlling and clearing the trades. 
There are two independent and, in principle, separate sections called transparent and 
anonymous. In the former each operator knows the institution behind each pending 
quote; in the latter the institutions are left anonymous.
The order book is filled by both requests of lending and borrowing capitals; however, 
as each market participant applies its own credit criteria and limits, the aggregation of 
the pending liquidity does not necessarily provide homogeneous tradable prices and 
quantities to each player. For example, an aggressor, defined as an operator who takes 
away liquidity from the book, is not necessarily able to trade the best pending prices 
as he may see a potential match denied by the candidate counterparty. Or, likewise, 
if the most competitive prices are posted by a counterparty feebly creditworthy for 
his criteria and limits, he could deliberately prefer to match a less competitive quote. 
Therefore e-MID does not systematically match the orders and the pending liquidity 
may overlap. In Figure 1 we depict a possible state of the book, using the same scheme 
normally dedicated to a security market. The different textures stand for different 
institutions, the height for the proposed volumes and the position on the x-axis for 
the proposed rate. The black solid blocks are those posted into the anonymous section 
of the market. Figure 1 (right) shows the possible overlap of orders. In a usual stock-
like market, where an overlapping limit order is immediately executed as a built-in 
mechanism and where the players do not have to manage the counterparty risk, this 
would not be possible.
Specifically, the market operations are:
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•  Quote. As in a security market, participants send their quotes as proposals. At any 
given time, the set of all pending quotes forms the pending liquidity.
•  Aggression. The usual market orders are replaced by aggression: an operator willing 
to remove liquidity from the book, i.e. to trade immediately without the uncertainty of 
limit orders, can deliberately pick a quote and manifest his will to match with the opposite 
interest.
•  Acceptance. The quoter of an ask quote, i.e. a quoter willing to lend capital, has the 
option to reject an aggression. This major difference from a security market gives a partici-
pant the opportunity to choose his counterparty and manage the credit risk.
•  Proposal. An aggressor can subordinate his will to close a trade to specific requests, 
such as a larger or smaller volume or a different rate.
The operator posting a quote anonymously (direct order) is disclosed only by another 
operator aggressing the pending quote. Both operators have the option of not closing a 
trade after knowing the candidate counterparty. 
3 Data Set
In order to clarify which information is in our hands, we describe more precisely the 
contents of our database. The database is composed by the records of all transactions 
registered in the period 01/1999-12/2009 in the Mercato Interbancario elettronico dei 
Depositi (e-MID). The period has been chosen in order to investigate banks’ behavior 
before, during and after the subprime crisis in the Euro area. Each line contains a code 
labeling the quoting bank, i.e. the bank that proposes a transaction, and the aggressor 
bank, i.e. the bank that accepts a proposed transaction. These parts are public regard-
less of the market section used to negotiate the transaction (transparent or anonymous), 
i.e. the parts are disclosed after a trade has taken place, even if the negotiations started 
from an anonymous order. The rate received by the lending bank is expressed per year; 
Figure 1: Scheme of a virtual aggregation of the order book. Different textures stand for different 
institutions, the height for the proposed volumes and the position on the x-axis for the proposed rate. 
The black solid blocks are those posted into the anonymous section of the market. On the right we 
show the possible virtual overlapping of orders.
Rate
3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17
Rate
3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17
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the volume of the transaction, i.e. the amount of lent money, is expressed in millions of 
Euros. A label indicates the side of the aggressor bank, i.e. whether the latter is lending/
selling («Sell») or borrowing/buying («Buy») capitals to or from the quoting bank. 
Other labels indicate the dates and the exact time of the transaction. Moreover, the 
records contain the contract the two banks are trading. The main difference between 
contracts is the length of the lending period. We consider only the overnight («ON») 
and the overnight long («ONL») contracts. The latter is the version of the ON when 
more than one night elapses between two consecutive business days, due to weekends 
or bank holidays. The banks are reported with a code for their country or a label for 
their class of capitalization (major, large, medium, small, minor) when they are Italian. 
A couple of example records are reported in Table 1.
We do not have any information regarding when and how a particular section of the 
market is used, i.e. whether some banks prefer to remain anonymous during the nego-
tiation; we do not know whether a transaction is the result of a specific proposal (see 
Sec. 1) and, finally, we do not know the content of the order book, i.e. we do not have 
complete information on the state of the liquidity, its dynamics and how the banks use 
this information when they act on the market. Various past studies investigated similar 
data (Gaspar, Perez-Quiros and Rodríguez Mendizábal, 2007) or the same data (De Masi, 
Iori and Caldarelli, 2006; Iori and Precup, 2007; Iori, Renò, De Masi and Caldarelli, 
2007; Iori, De Masi, Precup, Gabbi and Caldarelli, 2008; Delpini, Battiston, Riccaboni, 
Gabbi, Pammolli and Caldarelli, 2013; Zlatic, Gabbi and Hrvoje, 2015), although not 
always for the same length of time. In one case the whole book information was studied 
(Brousseau and Manzanares, 2005).
4 Rates and Spreads
The symbols vi and ri indicate, respectively, the exchanged volume and the rate of 
transaction i. As a first step we classically compute the mean rate registered in each 
analysed trading day d as
(1) r N r
1
d
d
i
i
N
1
d
=
=
r / ,
Table 1: Two example records from the data set. Quoter and aggressor are the banks participating 
to the trade. The groups are the classification of Italian banks with respect to their size. The label 
«Buy» indicates that the quoting bank is on the buy side, the label «Sell» that it is on the sell side.
Market Duration Date Time Rate Amount Start Date
«EUR» «ONL» «2007-01-02» «8:52:41» 3.60 160.00000 «2007-01-02»
«EUR» «ONL» «2007-01-02» «8:52:54» 3.60 50.00000 «2007-01-02»
End Date Quoter Group
Quoter
Aggressor Group
Aggressor
Verb
«2007-01-03» «IT0276» «ME» «IT0271» «GR» «Sell»
«2007-01-03» «IT0162» «PI» «GR0006» «ND» «Sell»
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where Nd is the number of transactions in day d. The results are reported in Figure 2. As 
a test we have computed also the volume weighted daily mean rate
(2) r
v
v r
d
v
ii
N
i ii
N
1
1
d
d
=
=
=r
/
/ .
The results of this second estimation are extremely close to the previous and thus we 
do not display a separate figure. Together with the daily mean rate, Figure 2 reports the 
ECB key rates for the considered period. The ECB defines the rates as follows (European 
Central Bank, 2011):
•  Marginal lending facility rate (EuroMLR): the rate fixed by the ECB for operations 
where counterparties can use the marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity 
from the national central banks (NCBs) against eligible assets. The interest rate on the 
marginal lending facility normally provides a ceiling for the overnight market interest rate.
•  Main refinancing facility operations (EuroRPS): regular liquidity-providing reverse 
transactions with a frequency and maturity of one week. They are executed by the NCBs 
on the basis of standard tenders and according to a pre-specified calendar. The main 
refinancing operations play a pivotal role in fulfilling the aims of the Eurosystem’s open 
market operations and normally provide the bulk of refinancing to the financial sector. 
The corresponding rate is here called EuroRPS.
•  Deposit facility rate (EuroDEP): counterparties can use the deposit facility to make 
overnight deposits with the NCBs. The interest rate on the deposit facility normally 
provides a floor for the overnight market interest rate.
The mean daily spreads in day d with respect to the EuroMLR, EuroRPS and Eu-
roDEP are
(3) s N r r
1
d
E
d
i d
E
i
N
1
d
= -
=
r ^ h/
where the superscript E is a label for EuroMLR, EuroRPS or EuroDEP. Figure 3 shows 
the results of this computation (left) together with the relative mean daily spread (right) 
defined as
(4) w
r
s
d
E
d
E
d
E
=
Even though the ECB changed twice the definition of the EuroMLR, this decision does 
not affect the significance of our analysis.
Observing the spreads, it is clearly possible to distinguish two different regimes. In the 
period preceding the Lehman Brothers collapse the spreads oscillate around a somehow 
stable value, while in the subsequent period the spreads oscillate more heavily at levels 
lower than usual. More specifically, after September 2008 the EuroRPS spread assumed 
consistently negative values, with the mean daily rate much below the usual ceiling roughly 
defined by the EuroMLR rate. In fact, the way the official rate corridor is designed (all 
the rates are compared with the official refinancing rate) makes it physiological that the 
EuroDEP spread is positive around 1%, the EuroMLR spread is negative around –1%, 
and the EuroRPS spread oscillates around 0%. The rationale of these spread values is that 
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all the interbank rates should always be higher (or equal) than the best borrowing rate of 
the central bank (EuroDEP) to incentive a demand for ECB funds. This way, the official 
rates directly shape all the credit rates, affecting both the price and the volume of credit.
Figure 3 (left) shows that before the financial crisis the expected values were confirmed, 
and also before the Lehman bankruptcy. What really shocked the rate structure was the 
collapse of the US investment bank, when all the spreads declined by about 1%. Until the 
end of 2009, as shown in Figure 3, borrowing money from the interbank market costed 
significantly less than refinancing from the central bank. This phenomenon lasted in 
2010 too. This evidence reveals that the European Central Bank did not cut its official 
rates as much as other monetary authorities, the Federal Reserve above all, but tolerated 
that interbank rates fell below the main refinancing rate: the huge amount of liquidity 
injected by the ECB during the crisis affected so much the interest rate level.
The period between the subprime shock and the Lehman collapse, when official inter-
est rates did not significantly change, shows a good relative spread control, see Eq. (4) 
and Figure 3 (right), while the subsequent cut of official rates generated an exceptional 
Figure 2: The mean daily rate (black) plotted together with the ECB key rates (coloured). The 
first vertical line marks the subprime crisis of August 2007 and the second the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008.
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increase of the opportunity cost of lending money with interbank deposits instead of 
putting money in deposit facilities.
4.1 Intraday price of money
Similarly to a previous study (Baglioni and Monticini, 2008), we consider the annual 
average EuroRPS spread as a function of the intraday time. More precisely, for each day 
d we compute the instantaneous mean value s¯ dE(t) considering the trades performed 
in the 30 minutes before and after t. We then average these quantities over all trading 
days within each year. The results are reported in Figure 4. Our outcomes reflect the 
immediate liquidation of the trades: since all overnight deposits must be regulated the 
subsequent business day at 9am, their time length decreases during the trading day. A 
negative shape of the spread was already observed by Baglioni and Monticini (2008) 
for the period 2003-2004. While Baglioni and Monticini used interest rate differences 
with respect to the daily average, we compute the spread with respect to the refinanc-
ing rate (EuroRPS) in order to isolate intraday patterns of the banks’ convenience to 
borrow money on the interbank market. For all the considered years (1999-2009) the 
pattern is negative. This validates the hypothesis that the interbank market implicitly 
transforms overnight loans into intraday loans, as proved by Baglioni and Monticini 
(2008). Since the ECB requires that all lending must be collateralized, banks could 
prefer to pay higher rates in the interbank market. Nevertheless, when we compare 
the maximum spread from 2000 to 2009, we observe a sharp change after the crisis 
(Figure 5). The spread exceeds the maximum value of 0.02 and in 2009 raises to 0.045.
This phenomenon is explained by the extraordinary liquidity need of European banks 
during the crisis. Furthermore, we observe a more regular shape during the crisis years 
(from 2007 to 2009). 
Figure 3: Left: mean daily spreads, Eq. (3). Right: relative mean daily spreads, Eq. (4). It is clearly 
possible to distinguish two different behaviors, one for the long period before the Lehman collapse, 
and one for the subsequent period.
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This arises a question: why should banks pay high interest rates early in the morning 
instead of waiting for an overnight loan traded in the afternoon? To answer we must 
recall the real time gross settlement introduced with the Euro and the need to pay back 
overnight deposits opened the day before. This means that from 8:30 to 9:00 am banks 
need to find money to regulate their debt. Usually, this is generated by physiological 
cash ins, while our results show that banks must find liquidity within the interbank 
market. Such a situation could be defined as hyper-speculative in a Minsky bank strategy 
(Vercelli, 2011), or, in other terms, a «borrow from Peter to pay Paul» strategy, as an 
early warning of trouble that ultimately results in undertaking a radical debt resolution 
scheme, bankruptcy, or even foreclosure.
Figure 4: Mean EuroRPS spread s¯ (t) as a function of the time of the day averaged over all trading 
days in each year with a time window of t ± 30 minutes.
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4.2 Interest rate volatility
The intraday rate pattern shows an increasing volatility during the crisis. The daily 
rate volatility vd is computed classically as
(5) 
N r r1
1
d
d
i d
i
N
2
1
d
v =
-
-
=
r^ h/ .
Its monthly average is reported in Figure 6 (left) together with its normalized value vd/
r¯ d (right). Figure 6 shows the magnitude of the interbank rate volatility after the two 
most critical events, respectively the subprime shock and the Lehman Brothers collapse. 
Two well-defined peaks are visible in the months after the two crisis milestones. Most 
of all, we can observe in Figure 6 (left) how the monthly volatility coefficient restored 
to pre-crisis levels within few weeks, thanks to a huge amount of liquidity provided by 
the European Central Bank. A different result appears when we estimate the normalized 
daily volatility averaged over a month (Figure 6, right). Here, the volatility continuously 
rises from 2% to 24%.
To explain the monotonic pattern of volatility and the apparently ineffective reduction 
of volatility between the two critical events (subprime crisis and Lehman collapse), we 
estimated the equation explaining the one month rate volatility with an OLS estimate 
of the model
(6) V V V Vi i i i i i i iMD 0 OS 0 dep 0 lend 1 1MD 1 1OS 1 1dep 1 1lend– – – – – – – –v a b v c g h v b v c g= + + + + + + +
corrected with autoregressive variables (lagged period of one month, reported in Table 
2 with a (–1)) and an error correction model factor, where
•  vi
MD is the standard deviation of one month deposit log returns;
•  vi
OS is the standard deviation of overnight swap log returns;
Figure 5: Mean spread range (max-min of Figure 4) from 2000 to 2009.
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•  Videp is the amount of bank liquidity deposited at the ECB (million Euros);
•  Vilend is the amount of bank liquidity borrowed from the ECB (million Euros).
The hypothesis behind the relation between volatility and volumes is that the rate vola-
tility should be negatively correlated with the amount of deposit facilities. Results are 
shown in Table 2.
Our findings show that the expected correlations are confirmed before the subprime 
crisis and after the Lehman collapse, while in between deposit facilities and rate volatili-
ties change, indicating the failure of policy makers to manage the interbank interest rate 
volatility. This power was restored after the Lehman bankruptcy, when not only central 
banks but also the US and European governments intervened to support the banks’ 
credibilities, collateralizing bond issues and interbank deposits to enhance the banking 
system’s trustworthiness.
Figure 6: Left: Daily rate volatility averaged over a month. Right: Normalized daily rate volatility 
averaged over a month. The daily rate volatility (left) shows two well defined peaks in the months 
following the two crisis milestones.
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Table 2: One-month interest rate volatility model by the ECB lending and deposit facilities, Eq. (6).
Coefficients with subscript –1 refer to independent variables lagged by a month.
Pre subprime crisis 
02/01/2005-08/08/2007
Post subprime crisis 
09/08/2007-12/09/2009
Post Lehman collapse 
12/09/2008-26/07/2010
a 1.24E-6 −7.88E-5 −3.671E-5
b0 0.301514** 0.104724 0.018339*
c0 3.73E-9** 7.12E-9*** 7.06E-7***
g0 −7.13E-9** 8.12E-7*** −2.32E-9***
h−1 0.074614** 0.035887*** 0.293388***
b−1 0.460955*** 0.072291*** 0.169428***
c−1 5.75E-9 1.20E-8*** 1.25E-7***
g−1 −4.61E-9 2.56E-7* −1.73E-9*
Error correction model −0.032949*** −0.037971*** −0.046397***
Adjusted R2 0.712308 0.519221 0.545169
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.241081 1.998579 1.867629
P (F-statistics) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
* means significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tail t-test), ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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4.3 Bid-ask spread
It has been well documented within the market microstructure literature that liquidity 
factors are important determinants of stock and bond returns. Such returns have been found 
to be affected by liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread (Amihud and Mandelson, 
1986; 1991; Kamara, 1994; Eleswarapu, 1997), the price impact of trades (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996), and the volume or turnover ratio (Haugen and Baker, 1996, Da-
tar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998). Cherubini (1997) modeled the liquidity risk by the proxy 
of the bid-ask spread in the market. Other papers based on the bid-ask spread have been 
proposed (Almgren and Chriss, 1999; Chakravarty and Sarkar, 1999; Hong and A. Warga, 
2000; Gwilym, Trevino and Thomas, 2002; Favero, Pagano and von Thadden, 2010). This 
approach is coherent with the examination procedures listed by the Federal Reserve even 
before the financial crisis (1998), asking to obtain all management information, reviewing 
bid/ask assumptions in a normal market scenario and reviewing stress tests that analyse the 
widening of bid/ask spreads and determining the reasonableness of assumptions. The estima-
tion of the bid-ask spread helps to assess the liquidity pressure during the crisis. Therefore, 
for each day we separate the transactions labeled «Sell» from those labeled «Buy» and 
we consider the corresponding rates. The mean values are then defined as
(7)
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where Nds and Ndb are the numbers of sell and buy transactions in day d. The bid-ask (or 
sell-buy) spread is now computed as
(9)  s r rd
sb
d
s
d
b= -r r .
Figure 7 shows the monthly average of ssbd. The presence of this spread is the first non-
trivial conclusion we can draw from the plot. The market is in fact different from more 
usual order-book markets. Moreover, two well defined peaks are clearly present after the 
crisis milestones. Their presence is a clear proxy of the diffidence that the banks had dur-
ing the worst moments of the crisis. During the crisis some bid-ask spreads experienced 
values higher than 200 basis points, while the usual pre-crisis level was around 3 basis 
points. Paradoxically, the liquidity stress seems to have been absorbed just before the 
Lehman collapse, when the bid-ask spread dropped below 5 basis points, i.e. the resistance 
level empirically observed before the sub-prime shock. This allows us to remark that this 
illiquidity proxy does not provide any early warning signal. Moreover, in both landmark 
events the spread trend appears to have been absorbed within a few weeks, exhibiting a 
strong correlation with the rate volatility pattern in Figure 6 (left). This is certainly due to 
the massive liquidity intervention of the European Central Bank, that from June 2007 to 
June 2010 increased its assets by about 600 billion Euros (+65%) using standing facilities, 
marginal lending facilities and open market operations, and easing the procedures and the 
eligible assets required to borrow money.
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5 Volumes, Trades and Active Banks
In the following the term monthly refers to a calendar month, i.e. from the 1st to 
the 30th, 31th or 28th (29th) day of a given month. This is an important remark because 
often, for accounting reasons, this is not the case. As before, the vertical lines in the 
figures indicate the beginning of the subprime crisis (August 2007) and the collapse of 
Lehman Bothers (September 2008). Moreover, the results are presented separating trades 
into deals where liquidity went from the aggressor bank to the quoter («Sell» label) or 
the opposite («Buy» label). Monthly averages of daily exchanged volumes, number of 
trades, active banks and quoting/aggressing banks are given in Figures 8, 9 and 10. The 
main difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods is the magnitude of the traded 
volumes. They have been steadily increasing until August 2007 and then rapidly collapsed 
after this time. It is unlikely that the overnight interbank market lost all this volume of 
trades. There are two factors: on the supply side, banks cut their exposures in order to 
reduce the loss-given default in a period of banking crises; on the demand side, banks 
preferred to avoid disclosing their need for liquidity in order to protect their reputation. 
Therefore, the interbank market volumes dropped and the grey market compensated.
Figure 7: Monthly average of the daily sell-buy spread defined in Eq. (9). Two well defined peaks are 
clearly present after the crisis milestones.
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Figure 8: Left: monthly averages of daily volumes. Right: monthly averages of daily trades. In both 
cases trades have been separated into deals where the money went from the aggressor bank to the 
quoter («Sell» label, continuous lines) or the opposite («Buy» label, dashed lines).
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Figure 9: Monthly average of daily active banks. A bank is considered active if it takes part in at least 
one trade during a given day, irrespective of its side (as quoter or aggressor).
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6 Correlations Between Banks’ Strategies and Rate Levels
In this section we would like to understand whether the banks act on the market 
regardless of the traded rate level or whether they take it into consideration. We restrict 
the analysis only to the transactions registered in the period 1999-2002 (1,020 days). 
This restriction is justified by the fact that we wish to discuss qualitatively the effect 
(or its absence) and by the nature of the statistics: for a reliable estimation we have to 
restrict the number of analyzed banks and use the period with the highest activity (by 
number of trades).
In the 1999-2009 period 269 different banks participated to the market operations, 
but most of them made very few transactions or participated only for a small number of 
days. We selected a subset of banks according to the same criteria of a previous analysis 
based on the same data set (Iori, Renò, De Masi and Caldarelli, 2007). Only the 86 
banks that participated actively to the market for more than 900 days and with more 
than 1000 transactions are considered. According to the same criteria, Iori, Renò, De 
Masi and Caldarelli (2007) considered 85 banks.
The cumulative volume function represents the net presence in the market, i.e. the 
strategy of a given bank. Two variants of this function are presented and analysed here.
1. The simple cumulative volumes:
(10) ( )v t v
( )
i ij
j
N t
simp
1
i
=
=
/ ,
where Ni(t) is the number of transactions performed by bank i up to time t and vij is the 
Figure 10: Left: monthly averages of the daily active banks acting as quoters. Right: monthly aver-
ages of daily active banks acting as aggressors. In both cases the trades have been divided respecting 
the «Sell» and «Buy» label in the records, indicating that the money flows from the aggressor to 
the quoter in the first case, and in the opposite direction in the second case.
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(signed) volume lent or borrowed by bank i in its transaction j. Notice that the index j 
runs over the transactions of each single bank and not over the total number of trans-
actions. To give the reader a qualitative idea of their behavior, Figure 11 reports a few 
random examples of the simple cumulative functions.
2. The absolute cumulative volumes:
(11) ( )v t v
( )
i ij
j
N t
abs
1
i
=
=
/ ,
with Ni(t) and vij defined as above.
We are interested in the correlation between the banks’ strategies, measured through 
these functions, and the interest rates. When speaking about spread in the following we 
refer to the spread between the transaction rates and the EuroRPS rate.
6.1 Hayashi-Yoshida estimator
The Hayashi-Yoshida (HY) correlation estimator (Hayashi and Yoshida, 2005) for 
asynchronous data as those of high-frequency financial time series is defined as
(12) ( ( ), ( ))p v t s t
v v s s
v v s s
i
ih ih
H
hh
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ih i hh
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2
1
2
1
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h h
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/ /
/ ,
where H is the number of intervals of length mmax, vih is the increment of one of the 
cumulative volume functions defined above for bank i in time interval h, sh is the mean 
value of the spread in time interval h, and vv H
1
i ihh
H
1= =r /  and
 
s sH
1
hh
H
1= =r /  are the 
sampled mean values of these quantities.
Figure 11: Examples of the simple cumulative volume functions for five banks.
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The HY method is a generalization of the classical Pearson estimator, consisting in 
how the elements vih and sh are computed. If no events are registered in a specific bin 
h > 1, the values of vih and sh are set equal to vi(h − 1) and sh − 1 respectively; if h = 1, their 
values are set equal to zero. The symbol mmax for the bin width has been chosen to em-
phasize the connection between this estimator and the Fourier method explained in the 
following subsection.
6.2 Fourier estimator
A method introduced by Malliavin and Mancino (2002) uses the Fourier expansion of 
a time series. It is explained extensively in almost any paper that uses it, see for example 
Renò (2003), but it is worth to write it once more here in a different more compact way 
that brings us directly to a simple formula to compute the Fourier coefficients.
Rescaling the time by a factor 2r/T to the interval [0, 2r], where T is the length of 
the time series, for our purpose we can define
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )expc ikt d tv vk i i0
2
=
r#
where vi(t) is one of the cumulative volume functions defined above. From the definition 
of vi(t) it is possible to write
(14) ( ) ( )expc ikt d vv
( )
k i ij
j
N t
00
2 i
=
r
=
e o/# ,
where the explicit case of the simple cumulative volume function has been taken as example. 
Continuing with the manipulation in order to obtain a simple tool for the estimation, 
we note that d v v t t0
( ) ( )
ijj
N t
ijj
N t
ij0
i i d= -= =` ^j h/ / , where tij is the time of transaction j of 
bank i, and finally we obtain
(15) ( ) ( )expc ikt vv
( )
k i ij ij
j
N t
0
i
=
=
/ .
Usually these coefficients are reported as the coefficients of the cosine and sine transforms, 
ak(vi) and bk(vi), respectively, i.e. the real and imaginary parts of ck(vi),
(16) ak(vi) = Re ck(vi),    bk(vi) = Im ck(vi).
The real parts of the Fourier coefficients of the covariance matrix elements is
2R  of the 
cumulative volume function wi(t) and the spread s(t) can be obtained as
(17) ( ) lima k a a s a s av v2 maxk is k j i j k j j k ij
k
2
1max
maxr
R = +
"3 + +=
^ ^ ^ ^h h h h6 @/ .
The elements is2v  of the integrated covariance matrix of the two time series can then be 
obtained as
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(18) 2 ( )ais is2 0 2v r R= .
Finally, the correlation is
(19) , )t s tvi is
ii ss
is
2
max
/t t
v v
v
=
m^ ^^ h h .
In each application, kmax is finite and defines the time scale mmax = T/(2kmax) at which 
the correlation is observed. Notice the correspondence between this value and the bin 
width in the definition of the HY estimator.
6.3 Results
One of our main aims is the analysis of the correlation t(vi(t), s(t + kDt)) between the 
cumulative volume functions previously defined and the past, present or future spreads, 
for an integer k and some time interval Dt. We fixed Dt and mmax to half a day, i.e. 1/
(2 × 1,020) of the whole analyzed interval, for both estimation methods, which are 
Figure 12: Correlation of the simple cumulative volumes ( )v tisimp  with the spread s(t) using the 
Hayashi-Yoshida (red line) and Fourier (blue line) methods. The banks are ordered by the value of 
the correlation given by the Fourier method. Apart from the different noisiness, which is lower in 
the Fourier case, the two methods are consistent, giving similar results and thus validating each other.
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compared in Figure 12 using the simple volumes and k = 0. A different choice of these 
parameters does not change the qualitative behavior of the results, which are shown in 
Figures 13 and 14, where only the Fourier method is used.
Figure 15 shows the variance of the distributions of the considered correlations versus 
the lag. For both tvisimp ^ h and viabs ( t ) the variance has a maximum at zero lag and de-
creases for both positive and negative lags, i.e. for both future and past spreads, without 
showing substantial difference in the two directions.
7 Bank’s Cost of Money
It is interesting to study whether some banks are able to borrow money for a lower 
rate than others and which market microstructure factors may explain this phenomenon. 
To do so, we consider the two weighted sums
Figure 13: Correlation of the simple cumulative volumes  ( )v tisimp  with the lagged spreads s(t + kDt) 
using the Fourier method. The banks are ordered by the value of the correlation at zero lag.
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Figure 14: Correlation of the absolute cumulative volumes ( )v tiabs  with the lagged spreads s(t + kDt) 
using the Fourier method. The banks are ordered by the value of the correlation at zero lag.
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where vij! are the lent (+) or borrowed (–) simple volumes, see Eq. (10), and wj is the 
relative spread of transaction j, see Eq. (4). The mean relative spread w¯ j uses a 30 min-
utes window. As before, i labels the different banks. Here the interesting quantity is the 
difference di between these two weighted sums,
(21) di = c ci i-+ - .
The results are summarized in Figure 16, which shows that some banks are able to obtain 
substantially better rates, while others obtain substantially worse rates. This may be due to:
•  Risk rank of the firm: each bank is implicitly ranked by its probability of default; 
other firms ask a higher price (rate) when lending money to a risky firm, and a lower 
price when lending to a safer firm.
•  Trading team skill: some banks could have invested more resources in their trading 
teams in this market, and this may improve their capability to obtain better rates.
•  Taking prevalently one side of the trade: we observed in Sec. 4.3 that acting as quoter 
instead of aggressor brings the advantage of gaining on the bid-ask spread, in the same 
fashion as in a stock market. If a firm is more capable to fulfill its needs as quoter it auto-
matically gains better rates.
Figure 15: Variance of the correlation values depending on the time lag. Each single value, i.e. each 
considered bank, is one point in the population.
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•  Business opportunities during the day: some banks could have better business op-
portunities than others during the day, so they accept to pay a higher rate in order to 
quickly access funds to invest in these opportunities.
Calling qi and ai the number of times the bank i concluded a trade respectively as 
quoter or aggressor and defining the difference
(22) ui = ai − qi
we can compute the magnitude of its linear dependence on di. If this measure is sensibly 
different in the three periods we can infer that trading prevalently as a quoter gave more 
advantages during the crisis periods, explaining at least partially the different shapes of 
Figure 16. Table 3 reports three measures of linear dependence and no clear pattern is 
recognisable. We understand that acting as a quoter is indeed connected with advan-
tages, but their magnitude did not change between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
However, we can add another piece of information exploiting the label attached to 
each bank code, as shown in Sec. 3. The label can take six different values, five to indicate 
Figure 16: Weighted differences di between the lent and borrowed volumes, see Eqs. (14) and (15) 
in Sec. 7.
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the bank size by total assets according to the classification scheme of the Bank of Italy 
(«MA» for «maggiori» i.e. major, «GR» for «grandi» i.e. large, «ME» for «medie» 
i.e. medium, «PI» for «piccole» i.e. small, «MI» for «minori» i.e. minor) and «FB» 
for «foreign bank» when the bank is not Italian. Table 4 gives the mean banks’ cost of 
money for these six classes in the three periods. The main effects we can observe are a loss 
of performance of major/large banks and an increase of performance of non Italian banks.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
The e-MID electronic overnight interbank market is an example of order-driven 
market; its features are built with the purpose of making the operators able to choose 
their counterparties and protect their identity. We have shown a collapse of the traded 
volumes during the crisis, which is a probable indication of a more risk-adverse behavior: 
the firms prefer to negotiate their overnight positions on a one-to-one basis rather than in 
a disclosed market. We computed the intraday structure of the negotiated rates reflecting 
the effective length of the contracts. The spreads between the mean rates and the ECB 
key rates behave in a very different manner after the Lehman Brothers collapse. In the 
same fashion as in a stock market we can see an increase of the rate volatility. Moreover, 
we have used a bid-ask spread as a good proxy of the market liquidity. The absence of 
significant correlations between rates and banks’ strategies suggest that the institutions 
use the interbank market considering mainly external factors, i.e. their trading activities is 
not highly conditioned by the rate level. Finally, we have shown that some banks are able 
to obtain substantially better prices when acting on the market and that the magnitude 
of this diversity strongly increases during the crisis. This advantage may be the result of 
more advanced trading techniques or, more interestingly, may reflect the different unof-
ficial trust levels of the institutions.
Table 3: Measures of linear dependence of ui as defined in Eq. (22) on di as defined in Eq. (21). No 
difference among the periods can be isolated clearly, suggesting that acting prevalently as a quoter 
yielded similar results before and during the crisis.
Pre crisis Post crisis Post Lehman collapse
Pearson –0.2166 –0.4302 –0.3622
Kendall –0.3578 –0.3396 –0.3363
Spearman –0.5015 –0.4778 –0.4895
Table 4: Mean cost of money for each bank group during the three analyzed periods: the turmoil af-
fected mostly the performance of major/large banks (negatively) and of non Italian banks (positively).
Pre crisis Post crisis Post Lehman collapse
Major –0.0039 –0.0310 –0.0404
Large –0.0023 –0.0398 0.0124
Medium 0.0001 0.0099 0.0047
Small 0.0161 0.0305 0.0232
Minor 0.0070 0.0074 0.0092
Non Italian 0.0051 0.0166 0.0347
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